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The ‘good farmer’: farmer identities and the control of exotic livestock disease in England. 1 
Abstract 2 
Exotic livestock disease outbreaks have the capacity to significantly impact individual livestock 3 
keepers, as well as devastate an entire industry sector. However, there has been limited 4 
research undertaken to understand how farmers think about and carry out exotic disease 5 
control practices within the social sciences. Drawing on aspects of Social Identity Theory and 6 
Self-Categorisation Theory, this paper explores how the ‘good farmer’ identity concept 7 
influences farmers’ exotic livestock disease control practices. Using findings from an in-depth, 8 
large-scale qualitative study with animal keepers and veterinarians, the paper identifies three 9 
context specific and at times conflicting ‘good farmer’ identities. Additionally, a defensive 10 
component is noted whereby farmers suggest an inability to carry out their role as a ‘good 11 
farmer’ due to government failings, poor practice undertaken by ‘bad farmers’, as well as the 12 
uncontrollable nature of exotic disease.  13 
Key words 14 
Good farmer, exotic livestock disease, social identity theory, biosecurity.   15 
Introduction 16 
The management of livestock disease is an essential aspect of good animal husbandry and 17 
livestock production. Animal keepers routinely deal with endemic diseases through both 18 
proactive and reactive control measures, including, for example, the implementation of animal 19 
health plans, vaccination programmes and the treatment of illness with antibiotics. However, 20 
the management of exotic livestock diseases is less routine, despite recent outbreaks of exotic 21 
diseases in England, including Swine Fever (2000), Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) (2001 and 22 
2007), Bluetongue (2007) and Avian Influenza (most recently in 2015). Additionally, a warming 23 
climate is increasing the risk of the introduction of other exotic diseases such as African Horse 24 
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Sickness (MacLachlan and Guthrie 2010).  In order to manage and prevent exotic livestock 25 
diseases, animal keepers are expected to carry out regular stock surveillance and implement a 26 
range of biosecurity measures such as limiting and controlling farm visitors; cleaning and 27 
disinfecting clothing, vehicles and buildings; and careful stock sourcing and isolation 28 
procedures. Animal keepers are also expected to report any suspicion of exotic livestock 29 
diseases promptly.  30 
Exotic livestock diseases pose significant risks to the livestock industry and can be a significant 31 
cost burden to the taxpayer in compensation paid to farmers. For example, £1.3 billion was 32 
paid in compensation for animals that were slaughtered during the 2001 FMD outbreak 33 
(Bourne 2002) and farmers faced an estimated £84 million in additional losses associated with 34 
other costs such as the restocking of livestock and wages (Sharpley and Craven 2001).  Despite 35 
this significant cost burden, there has been limited research undertaken into how animal 36 
keepers think about and manage exotic disease risk. Nonetheless, a number of useful studies 37 
have explored the ways in which farmers understand issues around (mainly endemic) livestock 38 
disease management, including biosecurity. For example, Enticott et al. (2012) distinguish 39 
between ‘localised’ and ‘population’ strategies to encourage farmer uptake of biosecurity 40 
practices, concluding that interventions which draw on locally situated practices and 41 
knowledges of disease are more likely to have a positive impact on biosecurity behaviour. 42 
Studies have also sought to explore the nature of animal disease governance, within an 43 
increasingly neoliberal political environment. For example, Hinchcliffe and Ward (2014) note 44 
the importance of situated knowledge practices rather than the promotion of a uniform 45 
approach in encouraging the uptake of biosecurity. Hinchcliffe and Ward (2014) suggest that 46 
farmers’ understandings of biosecurity (or what they label ‘making life safe’) are complex and 47 
may be threatened by conventional messaging from government which can often over-simplify 48 
the skilled, situated practices that farmers must adopt to remain free of disease. At a time 49 
when farmers are being encouraged to take a more active role in disease management 50 
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through the political framework of ‘cost and responsibility sharing’ (Garforth et al. 2013, Maye 51 
et al. 2014), understanding farmers’ biosecurity behaviour and the factors which are influential 52 
is essential.  53 
This paper draws on findings from a large qualitative study which explored animal keepers’ 54 
exotic disease control practices. The study included interviews with animal keepers who had 55 
direct experience of exotic disease and also asked animal keepers with no direct experience to 56 
consider their potential reactions to a range of exotic disease scenarios.  The paper builds on 57 
existing research in two main ways. Firstly, it addresses the under-researched area of exotic 58 
livestock disease management which has been somewhat neglected by the social sciences. 59 
Secondly, in conceptual terms, it draws on the notion of the ‘good farmer’ to explain how 60 
farmer identities are likely to influence their livestock disease management behaviour. This 61 
furthers work by Silvasti (2003), Burton (2004),  Sutherland and Burton (2011) and others who 62 
explore the role of farmer identity within the context of the adoption of new practices which 63 
may contravene farmers’ understanding of what being a ‘good farmer’ constitutes. This 64 
conceptual framework is applied in this paper to the context of exotic disease management, 65 
which has not been done previously.  66 
The ‘good farmer’ 67 
Researchers have explored the concept of the ‘good farmer’ to understand farmer attitudes 68 
and behaviour. The concept has been mostly applied to understand farmers’ conservationist 69 
versus productionist identities (Silvasti 2003, Burton 2004, McGuire et al. 2013). For example, 70 
Burton (2004) suggests that farmers may be reluctant to take up particular schemes (e.g. the 71 
Community Forest scheme) or change their practices in any way that may undermine their 72 
primary identity as producers of the nation’s food. In short, studies around farmer identities 73 
often conclude that farmers want to farm, potentially limiting efforts to influence uptake of 74 
4 
 
particular behaviours which may be considered to be at the side-lines of productive farming 75 
(Allison 1996, Burgess et al. 2000).  76 
Individuals’ values have been found to influence what an animal keeper considers to be ‘good’ 77 
or ‘bad’ practice. Tind Sorensen et al (2001) suggest that a farmer is faced by a wide variety of 78 
concerns which are likely to shape their values. For example, a farmer must consider issues of 79 
animal welfare, productivity, food safety, and impact on the environment. Certain issues are 80 
likely to conflict with others. Tind Sorensen (2001) points out that the goal of providing high 81 
welfare space for livestock may come into conflict with the goal of reaching a particular profit 82 
margin. Such a system may also conflict with some aspects of disease control which can be 83 
more manageable in intensive systems which offer less space to each animal. Te Velde et al. 84 
(2002) identify a range of values held by keepers relating to animal welfare that shape 85 
individual’s understanding of what constitutes being a ‘good farmer’ in relation to managing 86 
their livestock. These values include the following: animals should be treated well; they should 87 
be provided food, drink and shelter; they should be kept under hygienic conditions; and they 88 
should not be treated roughly. The authors also found that farmers often distanced 89 
themselves from examples of poor practice, disassociating themselves from what they 90 
considered to be particularly ‘bad’ production systems or animal welfare approaches.  91 
An animal keeper’s values are also likely to influence what they consider to be their own role 92 
in managing exotic disease risk. In a study conducted by Garforth et al. (2013), a distinction 93 
was made by animal keepers between the management of endemic and exotic diseases. Due 94 
to the strategic nature of exotic disease management and the public goods associated with 95 
control (e.g. sustainable and safe food supply), animal keepers were more likely to designate 96 
responsibility for the exotic disease control to the government, while endemic disease control 97 
was more often considered to be a shared responsibility. In relation to perceptions of 98 
responsibility, Huddy (2001) suggests that although government and the public may expect all 99 
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animal keepers to maintain a certain level of biosecurity implementation, the norms of the 100 
groups in which the keeper are positioned is likely to have a far greater influence. Therefore, if 101 
the shared values held by the group suggest that responsibility for exotic disease control lies 102 
with the government, messages from the government encouraging individual action may have 103 
limited influence on behaviour. Studies exploring the uptake of biosecurity measures (to 104 
address both endemic and exotic diseases), have shown that feelings of responsibility have a 105 
strong influence on biosecurity implementation. For example, where farmers consider the 106 
spread of a particular disease to be the fault of the government, reluctance to implement 107 
disease control measures at the micro level have been found to be high (Gunn et al. 2008, 108 
Maye, et al. 2014).   109 
The literature suggests that individual and collective identities, together with the associated 110 
values and norms, have an important influence on animal keepers’ attitudes and behaviour. 111 
This paper draws on the concept of the ‘good farmer’ to explore the role of identity within the 112 
context of exotic livestock disease control.  From a theoretical perspective, Social Identity 113 
Theory (SIT) and Self-Categorisation Theory are used to further explore ‘good farmer’ identity. 114 
These theoretical approaches are outlined in the following section.  115 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) 116 
During the 1970s and 1980s, SIT was developed by Taifel and Turner (Taifel 1970, Tajfel and 117 
Turner 1979) to help understand intergroup behaviour. SIT addresses a limitation of the 118 
Theory of Planned Behaviour which, despite having gained popular appeal in understanding 119 
and interpreting individuals’ behaviour, has been critiqued for being too focussed on 120 
individuals, thereby neglecting the wider contexts in which attitudes are formed and behaviour 121 
expressed. SIT suggests that an individual’s self-identity is influenced by their status within 122 
society, which in turn is strongly shaped by their social categorisation. SIT is therefore 123 
furthered by Self-Categorisation Theory, which describes the circumstances under which an 124 
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individual will perceive groups of people, including themselves, as belonging to particular 125 
social groups. Within the context of this study, such categorisations may include, for example, 126 
‘commercial’ or ‘hobby’ keepers, ‘cattle’ or ‘poultry’ keepers, ‘intensive’ or ‘extensive’ farmers, 127 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ farmers.   128 
A number of attempts have been made to integrate SIT into the Theory of Planned Behaviour 129 
(see, for example, Rise and Sheeran 2010, Fielding et al. 2011). In so doing, the link between 130 
self-identity and behavioural norms has been emphasised. Fielding et al (2011) argue that the 131 
norms of a particular group with which an individual identifies are likely to have a far greater 132 
influence on behaviour than the expectations of others outside of the group. Empirical 133 
evidence from other studies support this theory, including, for example, work on household 134 
recycling and fitness behaviours (Terry and Hogg 1996, Terry et al. 1999).  135 
The different roles and positions that an individual occupies help to form their personal 136 
identity. However, each individual shares these identities with others. For example, an 137 
individual is not the only cattle farmer, or the only small scale poultry keeper. Instead, these 138 
personal identities are shared, making them also collective identities. The interaction between 139 
personal and collective identities becomes salient when considering collective action, social 140 
norms or feelings of responsibility to others with which an individual may identify. Fielding et 141 
al (2011) point out that for the majority of the time, collective identities will remain latent. 142 
However, changes in contextual circumstances may bring collective identities to the fore. For 143 
example, a disease outbreak may lead individuals to more strongly demonstrate their 144 
collective as well as individual identities. Where an animal keeper may suspect disease on their 145 
farm, their individual identity as a ‘good farmer’ as well as their collective identity as a ‘cattle 146 
farmer’, and the associated group norms and feelings of responsibility, may encourage the 147 
keeper to report suspicion of disease quickly.  148 
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Self-Categorisation Theory suggests that an individual is more likely to act as a member of a 149 
particular group, the stronger they identify with it (Ellemers et al. 1999). An individual will hold 150 
a number of identities and the strength of a particular identity, influenced by a particular 151 
context or event, is most likely to impact on their behaviour (Terry and Hogg 1996). If an 152 
animal keeper does not associate with a particular identity (for example ‘cattle farmer’ or 153 
‘good farmer’) they may not behave in the same way as those who identify strongly with such 154 
groups. For example, an animal keeper may recognise that the welfare of their animals may 155 
have become neglected due to external pressures such as finances or personal health 156 
problems and may therefore no longer consider themselves to be a ‘good farmer’ or even a 157 
‘farmer’ at all and may cease to conform with the social norms of behaviour associated with 158 
that group.    SIT is not without its critics (Rabbie et al 2006). For example, Huddy (2001) finds 159 
that the theory fails to account for existence of identities acquired by choice (as opposed to 160 
automatic membership/identity) or to account for how identities progress from weak to 161 
strong.  Such criticisms are valuable, but SIT, especially when combined with insights from 162 
Social Categorisation Theory, can nevertheless provide a useful lens through which to explore 163 
how farmer identity may influence exotic livestock disease control behaviour. The methods 164 
adopted for the study are outlined in the following section. 165 
Methods 166 
This paper draws on data collected from 60 face-to-face interviews with animal keepers, 19 167 
interviews with government and private veterinarians and eight focus groups attended by a 168 
total of 60 animal keepers across England and conducted in early 2015. The primary research 169 
was designed to inform the evidence for the Department for Food, Environment and Rural 170 
Affairs’ (Defra) review of compensation payments for exotic livestock disease in England 171 
(animal health and welfare policy is a devolved issue with Scotland, Wales and Northern 172 
Ireland setting their own agendas). Study participants were selected from across four livestock 173 
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sectors (pig, poultry, cattle and sheep) and represented a wide range of systems (e.g. 174 
intensive/extensive, upland/lowland, food/non-food). Of the 60 animal keepers interviewed, 175 
50 were selected from existing databases held by Defra and had past experience of a 176 
suspected or confirmed case of an exotic disease. The remaining animal keepers were 177 
purposefully selected through industry gatekeepers and existing contacts to represent a broad 178 
range of farm types, sizes and systems. The veterinary participants were also selected from 179 
Defra databases identified as having been involved in the reporting or management of past 180 
suspected or confirmed cases of exotic disease.  Eleven of the vets were employed by the 181 
Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) and eight were private vets.  182 
The interviews lasted approximately one hour and asked participants to recall in detail their 183 
routine disease management practices. Interviewees who had past exotic disease experience 184 
were asked specifically to recall their actions during the suspected or confirmed outbreak. This 185 
included the point at which they became concerned, who they contacted, the actions that they 186 
undertook and the concerns and emotions that they experienced. A biographical narrative 187 
approach was adopted which encouraged interviewees to speak freely and in detail about 188 
their experiences, recognising the importance of wider social and environmental contexts 189 
which influence how events are experienced and recollected (Rist 1994).   190 
The sector specific focus groups were held in a range of geographical areas to ensure diversity 191 
in attendees. Two focus groups were held for each sector (pigs, poultry, cattle and sheep). . 192 
Focus groups lasted for approximately three hours and were facilitated by two experienced 193 
social scientists. Attendees were self-selecting and were contacted via industry gatekeepers to 194 
request attendance. All research participants were assured of anonymity and permission was 195 
obtained to record the interviews and focus groups. All recordings were transcribed verbatim. 196 
The interviews and focus group discussions centred on the potential role of compensation in 197 
influencing animal keeper disease management behaviour. However, a key area of discussion 198 
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was the routine management practices adopted by animal keepers and the factors influencing 199 
these practices, which forms the focus of this paper. Research participants were then asked to 200 
consider how their disease management routines may differ in two different scenarios. The 201 
scenarios focused on two alternative compensation systems: (1) a system based on penalties 202 
for poor disease management practice; and (2) a system based on bonuses for good disease 203 
management practice. The data were analysed using the qualitative software NVivo, following 204 
a coding framework which was devised based on an initial reading of interview and focus 205 
group transcripts to identity key themes and follow up meetings with all members of the 206 
research team.  Research team members were also asked to review the final coding of the 207 
transcripts in order to ensure validity. The results from the data collection and analysis are 208 
presented below. 209 
Results 210 
The study sought to establish animal keepers’ routine animal welfare and disease control 211 
practices and to explore how these might change in the event of an exotic disease outbreak. 212 
Central to animal keeper responses was the concept of the ‘good farmer’. Animal keepers 213 
regularly described what they considered to be ‘good stockmanship’. This differed significantly 214 
across the livestock sectors. 215 
Defining the ‘Good Farmer’ 216 
Intensive keepers, particularly those in the poultry sector, spoke about specific flock health 217 
indicators, including water intake and mortality rates. Such measures were regularly recorded 218 
and considered to be essential in maintaining animal health: 219 
“I think a very basic thing that everyone would do is you monitor your 220 
mortality…everyone would do that…You then have water monitoring, so every day you 221 
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would read a water meter and graph that and the same with the egg feed” (Poultry 222 
keeper focus group participant, ID31). 223 
“The birds that we buy are bought with a predetermined set of specifications, a KPI 224 
[Key Performance Indicators] to say that on day one it will weigh this, on day two it will 225 
weigh this. So the growth can be graphed and the food conversion can be graphed” 226 
(Poultry keeper focus group participant, ID33). 227 
In comparison to the specific markers used by poultry keepers to monitor animal health, 228 
keepers running extensive systems, particularly those within the cattle and sheep sectors, 229 
described identifying illness or disease in their stock as an innate skill or instinct and often 230 
found identifying signs of illness difficult to describe:   231 
“I would hope it would be fair to say that most decent stockmen or livestock farmers 232 
check their stock every day and if they aren’t being checked every day then they 233 
should be…the signs of good health are…for somebody sat in an office, it might be 234 
difficult to understand because you’re not going to be there with a sheet ticking things 235 
off but you very quickly see if an animal is off colour and it’s just something that you 236 
know, you have that ability to do” (Cattle keeper focus group participant, ID1). 237 
“You always know when something’s not right, you know. They look happy and if not, 238 
you’ve got problems” (Cattle keeper interviewee, ID28). 239 
Although at times keepers found it difficult to describe exactly what constitutes good animal 240 
welfare practices, livestock keepers often distinguished themselves from ‘bad’ farmers, who 241 
they considered to be ‘beyond help’. For example, during a focus group discussion, cattle 242 
farmers were presented with scenario one, which described a situation whereby the level of 243 
compensation would be reduced if the animal keeper was found to be undertaking ‘poor 244 
disease management practice’ thus representing a penalty. Participants were asked whether 245 
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such an approach would help improve areas of poor practice. The following responses were 246 
typical: 247 
 “Probably not, not if he’s going to do poor practice, it’s too late then” (Cattle keeper 248 
focus group participant, ID6).  249 
 “He wouldn’t realise it was poor practice in the first place” (Cattle keeper focus group 250 
participant, ID1).  251 
There was an assumption among research participants that all ‘proper’ animal keepers should 252 
be routinely undertaking what they considered to be ‘good practice’. When asked to reflect on 253 
scenario two, a compensation system based on bonus payments for ‘good disease 254 
management practice’, participants considered whether such incentives would have any 255 
influence on exotic disease control practices. According to a commercial duck keeper: 256 
“I think there should be an expectation that it should be done properly anyway, rather 257 
than paying people extra. There should be an expectation that it should be done 258 
properly and I think that if you are caring about your animals you would be doing it 259 
anyway” (Poultry keeper interviewee, ID84). 260 
Although distinctions were often made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ practice, or more generally, 261 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ farmers, research participants found defining a ‘good farmer’ difficult. For 262 
example, during a face-to-face interview, when asked to describe what he meant by the term 263 
‘good farmer’, a sheep keeper gave the following response: 264 
“Anyone that has got good stock, proud of their stuff, proud job, if we didn’t take pride 265 
in it, we’d have nothing…the proud farmers are better farmers” (Sheep kepper 266 
interviewee, ID85). 267 
Separation from ‘the Other’ 268 
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While all animal keepers involved in the study were prepared to recognise that areas of poor 269 
practice exist across all livestock sectors, pig and poultry keepers more regularly referred to 270 
‘poor farmers’ as particular sub-sectors of the industry, most regularly referring to hobby 271 
farmers. Cattle and sheep farmers were more defensive. For example: 272 
“There’s something like 1500 serious pig keepers…but there’s like 30,000 people in the 273 
country who keep pigs…Obviously, in an ideal world, I’d rather they didn’t but the 274 
world isn’t ideal and I have to accept that other people have to exist in the world. I 275 
think I have the right to expect that those people understand their obligations” (Pig 276 
keeper interviewee, ID119).  277 
“Taking into consideration the site that was affected with [Avian Influenza], on all four 278 
sides of it were areas of land that they sold off to hobby farmers. They all had chicken 279 
pens. One of them didn’t even have a pen they just wandered, so from our point of 280 
view, that’s the biggest risk. It’s like having a time bomb amongst your biosecurity. It 281 
doesn’t matter how much you control it on your land, it’s how you control it on 282 
neighbouring land” (Poultry keeper interviewee, ID3). 283 
“Hobby farmers, they might feed kitchen scraps to their pigs. They might actually have 284 
swine fever on the farm but nobody would necessarily know about it” (Pig keeper 285 
focus group participant, ID53). 286 
Poultry and pig keepers were more able to distance themselves from ‘bad farmers’ than those 287 
in the cattle and sheep sectors, often categorising themselves as ‘serious’ or ‘commercial’ 288 
farmers and others as ‘hobby’ farmers, while cattle and sheep keepers were less able to make 289 
a clear distinction. As one poultry keeper pointed out: 290 
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“Think about other agricultural sectors, nobody usually has a pet cow and its very rare 291 
to have a pet sheep, whereas for the poultry industry, all of a sudden [hobby farming] 292 
is a significant feature” (Poultry keeper interviewee, ID3). 293 
While commercial keepers were keen to distinguish themselves from hobby farmers, hobby 294 
farmers who were involved in the study did not make the same ‘us’ and ‘them’ distinction. 295 
Additionally, when hobby farmers were asked to outline their routine animal welfare and 296 
disease prevention practices, no obvious areas of poorer practice were encountered. 297 
There appears to be a clearer line between commercial and hobby farmers within the poultry 298 
industry, allowing keepers to identify with a defined sector of the industry. In comparison, for 299 
cattle and sheep farmers in particular, the line is far more blurred. What constitutes a ‘hobby’ 300 
cattle or sheep farmer is less clear. Instead of drawing a comparison between ‘commercial’ 301 
and ‘hobby’ farmers within the cattle and sheep sectors, farmers belonging to these sectors 302 
were more ready to distinguish themselves from ‘dealers’ and ‘travellers’ who they often 303 
suggested were ‘poorer’ animal keepers, more likely to ignore or hide disease: 304 
“The reporting wasn’t a problem [during the 2001 FMD outbreak]…if you know there is 305 
an outbreak, okay, reporting is pretty simple. But you get the odd dealer that will try it 306 
on, we all know it happened…they were actually moving sheep around in order to get 307 
the disease to get the compensation” (Sheep keeper interviewee, ID96). 308 
“We have quite a large travelling fraternity around where [the disease] was first 309 
diagnosed. They have got livestock and were shipping them out right, left and centre in 310 
trailers and land rovers…none of them have been registered so nobody knows that 311 
they actually exist so you don’t know if [FMD] could have been hanging around in 312 
some of that stock” (Cattle farmer interviewee, ID1). 313 
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In addition to identifying and distinguishing between different sub-sectors of the industry, 314 
animal keepers also distanced themselves from disease risk management by apportioning 315 
blame to the government.  This was particularly evident among cattle keepers: 316 
“I think we have a deep distrust of the government and a complete dissatisfaction and 317 
complete dissolution with anything that the government either throws at us or tries to 318 
will upon us” (Cattle keeper focus group participant, ID34). 319 
“[Exotic disease] is the government’s problem. They should sort it out and we should 320 
be compensated properly” (Cattle keeper focus group participant, ID9). 321 
With reference to the 2001 outbreak of FMD: 322 
“The government took a long time in not closing the country down for seven days, 323 
that’s what did the damage. The one case would have stayed pretty local if they’d 324 
stopped the first case; it took them seven days to close the country down” (Cattle 325 
keeper focus group participant, ID8). 326 
“Don’t tell me the reporting was a problem. The reporting wasn’t a problem, it was the 327 
government that were the problem” (Sheep keeper interviewee, ID96). 328 
Allocating blame to the government allowed farmers to distance themselves from having 329 
responsibility for controlling the spread of the exotic disease. Further distancing themselves, 330 
cattle keepers emphasised the uncontrollable nature of wind borne diseases such as FMD: 331 
“We have no control over it, full stop, there is nothing we can do.  It comes in on the 332 
wind, it can come in with birds and I’m afraid we haven’t got any control, whatever we 333 
do; whatever we can do we can’t control that one” (Cattle keeper focus group 334 
participant, ID2). 335 
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While some animal keepers felt there was very little they could do to control exotic disease, 336 
they explained that they would implement particular measures during an exotic disease 337 
outbreak, despite low levels of confidence in the efficacy of implementation: 338 
“It’s not going to stop any disease outbreaks but it looks as if you’re doing the best you 339 
can do” (Cattle farmer focus group participant, ID2). 340 
“We bolted down a disinfectant mat and kept that topped up [during the FMD 341 
outbreak] but I think a lot of it is a feel good factor from our point of view because if 342 
you were taken with foot-and-mouth you could have sat there hand on heart to your 343 
partner and said ‘I did my best’…I don’t think anything made a difference, it just made 344 
us feel better at the end of the day” (Cattle farmer focus group participant, ID1).  345 
This attitude indicates a wish to portray the ‘good farmer’ identity to those both within and 346 
outside of the livestock industry. While there was some doubt about the efficacy of 347 
implementing biosecurity measures, feelings of responsibility to the industry to be a ‘good 348 
farmer’ during an exotic disease outbreak were regularly encountered: 349 
“There’s a sense of ownership over [disease], and we’ve recognised that if we all run 350 
around in the middle of an outbreak and make it worse, we won’t have an industry. It 351 
would be very easy to spread, and so we all have a sense of responsibility over that 352 
and to protect what we’ve got” (Poultry keeper focus group participant, ID31). 353 
“If you know there is disease around, your biosecurity improves somewhat. Yes, 354 
definitely, you would be more vigilant. Because, you know, hopefully, as an industry, 355 
farmers will think they’re sort of in it together. You’re protecting your own livelihood, 356 
but at the same time you’re very aware that what you’re doing could be affecting 357 
others” (Sheep keeper interviewee, ID96). 358 
Conflicting Identities 359 
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The complexities of the ‘good farmer’ identity concept were evident in the various 360 
responsibilities that the animal keepers recognised. In particular, there were conflicts at times 361 
between a range of responsibilities, including responsibility for keepers’ own livelihoods, 362 
responsibility for the welfare of their livestock and responsibility to other local livestock 363 
keepers. These conflicts were clearly evidenced by the experiences of one commercial pig 364 
keeper whose pigs were culled during the 2000 Swine Fever outbreak, despite being clear of 365 
the disease. The keeper was informed by the then Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 366 
(MAFF) that his pigs would be culled as they were classed as a ‘dangerous contact’ due to the 367 
farm’s proximity to other pig herds that had contracted the disease. Initially, the pig keeper 368 
refused and requested that the case be taken to Judicial Review. However, the keeper was 369 
informed that movement restrictions would remain on the farm and the local area until the 370 
outcome of the review was known. The keeper recognised that this would delay the recovery 371 
of the local pig industry in his area and allowed the cull to proceed:  372 
“[The MAFF representative] said, ‘if we’re going for a judicial review, by the time they 373 
tell you they’re going to kill the pigs, you will have to put the slaughter date back’. I 374 
said, ‘the situation is, none of my mates are going to understand. We all know each 375 
other, they’re not going to be very pleased with me’…I didn’t want to delay the 376 
slaughter because you’re dealing with a community of pig farmers, who I know most of 377 
them, and you’re telling them, ‘we aren’t going to get out of this problem because I’m 378 
arguing over it’” (Pig keeper interviewee, ID122).  379 
Another pig keeper whose herd was culled as they were considered to be a ‘dangerous 380 
contact’ also demonstrated the complexities surrounding the ‘good farmer’ identity in relation 381 
to maintaining animal welfare. In comparison to the case outlined above, this pig keeper 382 
requested that his pigs be culled in order to end their suffering due to poor living conditions 383 
17 
 
brought about by a long period of movement restrictions during the 2000 Swine Fever 384 
outbreak. The keeper’s situation is demonstrated by the following quote: 385 
“By the time we got to the middle of September…by then we’d been held up for 386 
getting on for eight weeks…I can’t stop the old girls giving birth…I rang the vet and said 387 
‘you need to get in touch  with [MAFF], you need to persuade them that I am a 388 
dangerous contact’…They never found [Swine Fever] here and I would have been 389 
disappointed if they had found it because we were really strict about who was allowed 390 
on. It wasn’t a particularly easy decision; it’s not a particularly nice thing” (Pig farmer 391 
interviewee, ID119). 392 
The results presented here have demonstrated the wide range of identities with which an 393 
animal keeper may associate and their related practice-based complexities. The potential 394 
implications of these findings are discussed below.  395 
Discussion and conclusion 396 
The results presented in the previous section demonstrate the complexities associated with 397 
the identity of the ‘good farmer’ within the context of exotic livestock disease management. 398 
Animal keepers clearly hold a number of individual and collective identities and the wider 399 
context in which they are positioned is likely to have an important influence on which identity 400 
or identities drive their behaviour. The role of social identity and self-categorisation has been 401 
explored previously in terms of how it may shape the identity of an individual and influence 402 
their behaviour. Taifel (1970) suggests, for instance, that an individual defines himself and 403 
others based on his or her location within a system of social categories. An individual’s 404 
identity, and in particular their values, is therefore shaped by comparisons with other 405 
categories of society. 406 
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This study sought to explore the concept of the ‘good farmer’ within the context of exotic 407 
livestock disease management. In-depth analysis of the data collected for this study 408 
emphasised the complexities associated with understanding exactly what a ‘good farmer’ is. In 409 
relation to exotic disease control, a number of ‘good farmer’ identities were noted and 410 
included: the ‘Good Stockman’ identity; the ‘Good Neighbouring Farmer’ identity; and the 411 
‘Good Public Facing Farmer’ identity. Each of these is likely to drive particular exotic disease 412 
management behaviours. Farmers may associate with one or more of the three identities 413 
alongside other personal and collective identities, each of which may become more latent or 414 
salient depending on a particular context. Each of these identities is discussed in more detail 415 
below.   416 
 The ‘Good Stockman’ identity. Firstly, the ‘good stockman’ identity focused on the 417 
health and welfare of the animals to which good stockmanship was central, often 418 
described as innate, tacit knowledge, particularly among cattle and sheep keepers. 419 
Identifying disease and reporting suspicions of disease quickly to prevent the spread of 420 
disease was considered to be driven primarily by the ‘good stockman’ identity; 421 
however, the complexities surrounding this were exemplified by the need to make 422 
difficult decisions, including the culling of large numbers of animals on welfare 423 
grounds. Additionally, where keepers undertaking poor practice could not be allocated 424 
to a sub-group of the sector, research participants were more defensive of their 425 
behaviour, blaming personal, financial and/or health reasons rather than allowing the 426 
poor practice to be associated with the wider identity of the sector. 427 
 The ‘Good Neighbouring Farmer’ identity. Secondly, the ‘good neighbouring farmer’ 428 
identity was also evident whereby animal keepers involved in this study regularly 429 
voiced feelings of responsibility to local farmers, with whom many were well 430 
acquainted, to prevent disease spread and resume business function as soon as 431 
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possible. The ‘good neighbouring farmer’ did not want to be judged poorly by other 432 
local animal keepers or to cause unnecessary problems, particularly to those with 433 
which the keeper identifies most closely (e.g. other local keepers in the sector).  434 
Returning to Fielding et al’s (2011) work on social identity, animal keepers are likely to 435 
relate to a number of identities, with certain identities becoming more salient 436 
depending on a particular context. In relation to the pig keeper example outlined in 437 
the results section, where the pig keeper eventually agreed to allow his pigs to be 438 
culled, the farmers ‘good animal welfare’ identity was superseded by his ‘good 439 
neighbouring farmer’ identity due to the unusual context in which he was positioned.  440 
 The ‘Good Public Facing Farmer’ identity. Thirdly, moving on from the micro level, 441 
research participants demonstrated the ‘good public facing farmer’ identity, whereby 442 
animal keepers felt a responsibility to the wider industry to portray good disease 443 
control practices during exotic disease outbreaks in order to maintain a positive 444 
industry identity, despite voicing doubts about the efficacy of such measures. Research 445 
participants were mainly only concerned about the portrayal of their own sector 446 
rather than of animal keepers more generally, often distinguishing between sectors 447 
and at times criticising the disease management practices of keepers in other livestock 448 
sectors. For example: 449 
“If you start at the biosecurity policy, I would say I would score, let’s say an 450 
eight, against a sheep farmer who’d score one or two” (Pig keeper focus group 451 
participant, ID49). 452 
“The sheep people, let’s make no bones about it, they’re mucking about with 453 
these bloody sheep, they’re going from one end of the country to the 454 
other…and they’re all sort of laughing about it” (Cattle keeper interviewee, 455 
ID81).  456 
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Defending the ‘Good Farmer’ Identity 457 
The ‘good public facing farmer’ identity clearly exemplifies a defensive component which was 458 
evident throughout the data. Research participants regularly made sense of their individual 459 
and communal identities by rejecting the ‘other’.  Turner (2006) argues that, in their search for 460 
a positive identity, individuals will focus on areas of distinctiveness that positively differentiate 461 
their social grouping from other categories of society. As demonstrated in the the results 462 
section of this paper, animal keepers involved in this study regularly defined themselves as a 463 
particular ‘type’ of animal keeper and made distinctions between themselves and others. The 464 
most regularly encountered distinction was made between ‘commercial’ or ‘proper’ farmers 465 
and ‘hobby’ farmers/keepers. This distinction is clearly value driven and linked to the wider 466 
productionist ‘good farming’ logic discussed elsewhere (see, for example, Burton 2004). This 467 
was referenced most often where the distinction between the groups was clear within the 468 
livestock sector, which is particularly the case for poultry keepers. Where the distinction was 469 
more fuzzy, other categorisations were differentiated, for example, commercial livestock 470 
keepers referenced poor practice among ‘dealers’ and ‘travellers’ who they did not consider to 471 
be ‘proper’ farmers. Animal keepers also differentiated between ‘farmers’ and ‘government’ 472 
who they regularly criticised for poor management of previous exotic disease outbreaks. 473 
Where distinctions between categories of animal keepers were less clear, research participants 474 
simply differentiated between what they defined to be ‘good’ or ‘bad’ farmers. 475 
In order to protect the positive identity of the sector, research participants also regularly 476 
apportioned blame for exotic disease spread elsewhere, most often to government but also to 477 
the uncontrollable nature of exotic disease. For example, research participants often referred 478 
to the spread of wind-borne pathogens as being completely outside of their control, thus 479 
defending any lack of individual action.  Accounts of bad exotic disease management by 480 
government representatives were regularly encountered, as exemplified by quotes from 481 
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research participants reported in the results section, particularly in relation to FMD. 482 
Experience is likely to have an influence on animal keepers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of 483 
the government to provide suitable guidance in relation to keepers’ role in exotic disease 484 
control. This study found that cattle and sheep keepers were often more negative in relation 485 
to the government’s role and the relevance of their policies and guidance. This may be related 486 
to the significant exotic disease outbreaks experienced by the sectors in recent memory, in 487 
particular the 2001 and 2007 FMD outbreaks. In both cases, research participants regularly 488 
blamed the government’s lack of decisive action or poor regulation for the spread of the exotic 489 
disease and rarely apportioned any responsibility to livestock keepers themselves. In 490 
comparison, livestock keepers from other sectors, particularly poultry were less likely to 491 
portray the government in similarly negative terms. Across all sectors, emphasis was given to 492 
the need for government responsibility for exotic disease control, especially in relation to 493 
controlling borders. This has animal health policy implications in terms of farmer buy-in to a 494 
cost and responsibility sharing compensation system between government and industry for  495 
exotic disease management and warrants further exploration. 496 
Poor relations with government and the apportioning of blame within the livestock disease 497 
management context has been reported by others  (see Hall et al. 2004, Heffernan et al. 2008). 498 
Research participants also criticised the advice provided by government during exotic disease 499 
outbreaks. In relation to Social Categorisation Theory and SIT, Fielding et al (2011) suggest that 500 
relations between the in-group and the out-group may have an important influence on 501 
whether in-group members decide to carry out a particular behaviour being promoted by the 502 
out-group. The salience of messages communicated by those perceived as outside of the group 503 
is likely to be strongly influenced by the extent to which the situation is considered to be 504 
characterised by an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality. As Fielding et al (2011) state, there is significant 505 
research that suggests that messages coming from outside of the group are less likely to be 506 
trusted and there is likely to be more resistance to criticism from outgroup members. 507 
22 
 
Additionally, where the greater power or status of the outgroup is perceived by in-group 508 
members to be illegitimate, in-group members may resist or undermine messages 509 
communicated by the outgroup. Fielding et al (2011) suggest that failing to follow guidelines or 510 
recommendations can be one way by which in-group members can register their resistence 511 
against the outgroup. Understanding an individual’s or group’s identity may therefore have an 512 
important influence on how messages from government or others outside of the group 513 
communicate messages and encourage particular behaviours. For example, messages to 514 
encourage good routine disease surveillance practices and early reporting of disease suspicion 515 
may be framed to appeal to animal keepers’ ‘good stockman’ identity. In comparison, 516 
messages to encourage heightened biosecurity practices during an exotic disease outbreak 517 
may be best framed to appeal to animal keepers’ ‘good public facing farmer’ identity.  518 
This study has demonstrated the complexities associated with the identity of the ‘good 519 
farmer’. Animal keeper practices are likely to be influenced by what they understand to be 520 
their individual identity as a ‘good farmer’ as well as their collective identities as perceived by 521 
those within the sector, as well as the perceptions of those outside. Although SIT and Self 522 
Categorisation Theory have provided a useful lens through which to consider the findings from 523 
this study, it is worth noting some limitations. First, SIT often assumes the existence of fixed 524 
groups with clear boundaries; however, this study has shown that group identity occurs on a 525 
continuum and is fluid and context dependent. Farmers may identify more strongly with a 526 
particular group during times of crisis or may similarly distance themselves from a particular 527 
group with which they may otherwise identify. Such shifts are difficult to predict and may 528 
occur quickly. Second, limited research has been undertaken within the context of SIT to 529 
explore the extent to which particular personality traits may influence the extent to which an 530 
individual may seek to ascribe to particular group identities. This study has shown that feelings 531 
of responsibility may influence identity. Further research would be beneficial here in relation 532 
to what drives certain farmers to have stronger feelings of responsibility than others. Third, 533 
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the findings from this study have emphasised the difference between ascribed and acquired 534 
identity. Ascribed identities such as being a beef farmer or a hobby farmer may have little 535 
influence on a farmer’s behaviour compared to an identity that a farmer acquires, or perhaps 536 
even aspires to, brought about by a certain set of circumstances (e.g. good public facing farmer 537 
identity). These complexities emphasise the difficulties associated with predicting or assigning 538 
group identities.  539 
This study has shown that the ‘good farmer’ identity within the context of exotic disease 540 
management is not simply confined to behaviour and values associated with good 541 
stockmanship, as outlined by Te Velde et al (2002), but is instead complex and context specific, 542 
incorporating identities which account for responsibilities to other farmers and the industry 543 
more generally. The findings presented therefore contribute to the further development of the 544 
‘good farmer’ identity concepts and its constituents by outlining the factors that farmers 545 
perceive as threatening their ability to effectively carry out their ‘good farmer’ identity in 546 
relation to exotic disease management. These include uncontrollable factors such as weather, 547 
as well as the behaviour of others, including the government and specific groups such as hobby 548 
farmers, dealers or travellers. This defensive component is likely to influence the farmer’s 549 
perceptions in relation to their own role in disease control and the roles of others.   The farmer 550 
identities outlined by this study are specific to the context of exotic disease control in England. 551 
While some of the findings may be relevant elsewhere, it is likely that other identities may be 552 
more salient in other geographical contexts with different exotic disease histories. For 553 
example, the defensive component which has been identified here may be less discernible in a 554 
country where there has been limited experience of exotic disease and/or where recent 555 
outbreaks have been brought under control quickly. In order to understand and potentially 556 
influence behaviour, it is important that the range of farmer identities are recognised within 557 
the particular context of interest and used to inform policy approaches to understand and 558 
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